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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-2411

ALBERT MULYAWAN NG,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A78-498-624
(U.S. Immigration Judge: Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy)

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 17, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 26, 2009 )

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Albert Mulyawan Ng seeks review of a final decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to

deny Ng’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the
petition for review.
I. Background
Ng is an Indonesian, ethnically Chinese Buddhist. He spent most of his life in
Pontianak, Indonesia, but lived in Jakarta for several months prior to leaving for the
United States. He arrived in this country on December 2, 2000, on a non-immigrant
visitor visa, and remained after the visa expired. His wife and three children continue to
reside in Jakarta.
In March 2002, Ng filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the CAT. Ng did not apply for asylum within one year of his arrival in
the United States as generally required by INA § 208(a)(2)(B) [8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B)].
However, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concluded that several changes in the assignment
of judges handling Ng’s case constituted sufficiently extraordinary circumstances to
excuse the delay. INA § 208(a)(2)(D) [8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D)]. The IJ therefore ruled
on the merits of Ng’s application in its entirety. On September 25, 2006, the IJ denied
Ng’s application and ordered his removal.
Ng appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the
IJ’s order without opinion. This petition for review followed.
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II. Analysis
Because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without issuing an opinion, “we review
the IJ’s opinion and scrutinize its reasoning.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d
Cir.2003). We will review legal conclusions de novo, see Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325
F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003), and we will uphold factual determinations if they are
supported “by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as
a whole.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004).
Ng’s sole argument on appeal is that, despite the IJ’s conclusion to the contrary,
his subjective and objective evidence was sufficient to meet his burden of proof for his
claim of persecution on account of his Chinese ethnicity.
We first note that Ng states in his brief that he does not claim to have experienced
past persecution. This is consistent with his position before the IJ, where he stated that
“[m]y claim for asylum is based solely on my fear of future persecution. . . . I really do
not have any prior experiences of harm.” A.R. 338. However, Ng later argues in his brief
that he “met his burden of proof and persuasion that he suffered past persecution. . . .”
Thus, it is unclear whether or not Ng is pressing a claim of past persecution. In any event,
we have reviewed the record and conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
decision that Ng’s evidence was insufficient to show past persecution.
Ng’s testimony focused on an ongoing violent tribal conflict between two groups –
the Dyaks and the Madurese – in Pontianak, Indonesia, where Ng was raised. However,
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Ng stated that “the ethnic Chinese did not get involved in this conflict between these two
ethnic groups. . . .” Ng did not testify that he personally suffered persecution (or indeed,
any harm whatsoever) on account of his Chinese ethnicity as a result of the tribal conflict.
Ng testified to a single 1997 incident involving his brother-in-law, who experienced
harassment and an extortion threat from Madurese individuals who blamed the brother-inlaw for the arrest of their family member. Indonesian officials intervened and put an end
to the harassment.
The IJ held that this lone incident did not rise to the level of persecution. We
agree. Persecution refers to “‘extreme conduct’” such as “‘threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or
freedom.’” Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 534, 536 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fatin v. INS,
12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)). Persecution does not include “isolated incidents that
do not result in serious injury.” Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005).
In Lie v. Ashcroft, we held that an Indonesian asylum applicant of Chinese origin
failed to submit sufficient evidence to support her claim of past persecution, because she
did not establish that two robberies of which she was the victim were “on account of” her
ethnicity, or were sufficiently serious to amount to persecution. See Lie, 396 F.3d at
535-36. Although Ng argues that Lie is distinguishable and that his case “rises and falls
on its own merits,” Ng fails to explain how or why his evidence of past persecution is
more persuasive than that of the applicant in Lie. Indeed, Ng, like the applicant in Lie,
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did not demonstrate that he faces persecution “on account of” his ethnicity, nor did he
describe any incident rising to the level of persecution. Thus, the IJ correctly held that Ng
did not meet his burden of proving that he suffered past persecution.
In order to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, Ng was required to
show both a subjective fear of persecution through credible testimony and an objective
basis for that fear. Lie, 396 F.3d at 536. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
conclusion that Ng failed to satisfy the subjective aspect of the analysis.
Although Ng claimed to fear future violence as a result of the Dyak/Madurese
tribal conflict, he did not testify that his fear is based upon violence specifically targeted
at ethnic Chinese individuals. Rather, Ng testified to a fear of incidental harm,
acknowledging that ethnic Chinese individuals are not directly involved in the conflict.
See A.R. 339 (“I did not experience any direct harm during any fighting between the
Dyaks and the Madurese. However, as one who is ethnic Chinese I do fear that I could,
in the future, be victimized as I would find myself in the middle of that conflict.”). In
addition, Ng testified that to his knowledge, the tribal conflict did not extend to Jakarta,
where his wife and children have been residing since 1995, see A.R. 338, and where Ng
lived prior to fleeing Indonesia.
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Ng testified that he left Jakarta due to economic problems and the fact that he did
not own a home, not because of a fear of persecution.1 Indeed, Ng’s wife and children
continue to reside there without suffering persecution, which diminishes the
reasonableness of Ng’s claim. See Lie, 397 F.3d at 537.
Ng responds that he should prevail because he provided sufficient objective
evidence of a “pattern or practice” of persecution of ethnic Chinese individuals in
Indonesia, including a 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, a 2005
International Religious Freedom Report, a 2002 Amnesty International Report, and other
articles. However, because Ng failed to satisfy the subjective prong of the well-founded
fear test, see Lie, 396 F.3d at 536-37, his objective “pattern or practice” evidence is not
sufficient to sustain Ng’s burden.2
In sum, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Ng failed to meet his
burden of proof to demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of his Chinese ethnicity for purposes of asylum. In addition,
1

We have recognized that deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage
which threatens a petitioner’s life or freedom may constitute persecution. See Li v. Att’y
Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 167-68 (3d Cir. 2005). However, Ng did not testify to any severe
economic hardship, or to any economic challenge not generally faced by others in
Indonesia. See id. at 168.
2

In addition, contrary to Ng’s arguments, it is not clear that the objective evidence
would compel a finding that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution of ethnic
Chinese individuals in Indonesia. For instance, the 2005 Country Report provides: “The
government officially promotes racial and ethnic tolerance. . . . Instances of
discrimination and harassment of ethnic Chinese declined compared with previous years.
Recent reforms increased religious and cultural freedoms.” A.R. 63.
6

because Ng did not meet his burden of proof for asylum, the IJ correctly determined that
Ng necessarily failed to meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal. See,
e.g., Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2008). Finally,
although Ng’s brief makes passing reference to the CAT, he raised no argument that he
would face any likelihood of torture in Indonesia, see, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2), or
that the IJ erred in any respect in denying his CAT claim. We therefore must conclude
that Ng abandoned the claim for CAT protection. See, e.g., Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d
215, 221 (3d Cir. 2004).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the BIA’s decision and deny the petition
for review.
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